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This is the second edition of John M. Coo-
per’s book on Plato’s Theaetetus, and it 
appears to be unchanged from the first 
edition published in 1990. Cooper is a 
prominent ancient philosophy and Pla-
to scholar, perhaps mostly known for the 
edition of Plato’s Complete Works, togeth-
er with D. S. Hutchinson back in 1997, 
as well as various philosophical studies 
such as Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of 
Life in Ancient Philosophy from Socrates 
to Plotinus (2012), Reason and Emotion 
(1999), Reason and Human Good in Aris-
totle (1975), etc. Holding his study of The 
Theaetetus means holding an important 
piece of the history of philosophy in your 
hands - it is not a book which one leaves 
on the shelves after reading, it needs to 
be reflected upon and absorbed through 
time. Its polemic structure simply begs for 
a deeper analysis of the topics discussed. 
So, what are the main interpretive prob-
lems in Plato’s Theaetetus, and what solu-
tions does Cooper offer?
Above all, one has to notice that Coo-
per does not consider The Theaetetus in 
isolation from the other dialogues. His 
analysis of Plato’s influential epistemolog-
ical treatise seems to be a part of a much 
greater endeavor: showing that there are 
inconsistencies and disagreements between 
the most important metaphysical and epis-
temological doctrines of the middle peri-
od dialogues, particularly The Republic, 
and later dialogues, such as The Theaete-
tus, The Philebus, or The Sophist. Cooper 
claims there are two main groups of Pla-
tonic scholars - those who believe that the 
main philosophical conclusions of The Re-
public constitute the core of Plato’s philos-
ophy which is retained in The Theaetetus 
and other dialogues, and those who chal-
lenge this position by arguing that the con-
clusions of the late dialogues significantly 
differ from the middle period metaphysics 
(p. 3). In his book, Cooper allies with the 
second group of scholars, and identifies 
his main opponent in Paul Shorey, who 
follows F. M. Cornford, A. E. Taylor and 
other “orthodox”, or “traditional” inter-
preters of Plato’s philosophy. According to 
Cooper, Shorey strongly rejected any idea 
about revisions and developments in Plato’s 
philosophy, he was against the theory that 
the dialectical dialogues criticize and reject 
some of the central philosophical conclu-
sions of middle period Platonism, as well 
as that there is any alteration of Plato’s 
position before or after The Republic (p. 
4). One of the main concerns of Platonic 
scholars is, of course, the notion of Forms. 
In The Republic, Forms are fundamental 
to the explanation of knowledge, but in 
The Theatetus, this is not the case. Plato 
seeks a different definition of knowledge. 
Even so, scholars such as Shorey, do not 
find this sufficient to argue that The The-
aetetus represents a significant divergence 
644 │ PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY, VOL. 29, NO. 4
from the middle period epistemology. Sho-
rey attacks any “genetic” interpretation of 
Plato’s philosophy, such as the one which 
developed in 19th century Germany. Coo-
per’s main task is, therefore, to show that 
thorough analysis of Plato’s argument in 
The Theaetetus reveals irreconcilable dif-
ferences between the middle and the late 
period epistemology. In his opinion, this 
is sufficient to disapprove Shorey and the 
first group of scholars.
The book has a simple, well-thought 
structure which follows the structure of 
The Theaetetus. In the first chapter, Coo-
per deals with the “amalgamation” of the 
epistemological theories of Theaetetus, 
Protagoras, and Heraclitus (The Theaete-
tus, 151a-161a). The preliminary questions 
about the nature of knowledge are raised 
here, and Theaetetus proposes the first 
definition of knowledge as perception, 
only to be refuted by Socrates throughout 
the dialogue. In Plato’s view, Theaetetus’ 
understanding of knowledge as percep-
tion incorporates the most important as-
pects of the Protagorean and Heraclitean 
doctrines, the first being that “it is incor-
rect to say that something is true without 
saying to whom it is true” (152a), and the 
second that “all things are in flux” (152d). 
This way, Plato’s Socrates actually argues 
against Protagoras and Heraclitus whose 
views are put to the mouth of “naive” The-
aetetus. Cooper takes a great deal of effort 
to explain how could Protagaras’ theory be 
reduced to the one of Heraclitus, as this is 
not immediately clear to Plato’s readers (pp. 
14-26, ff.). Some of the relevant passages 
from The Timaeus, concerning the notions 
of genesis and ousia, are recalled here by 
the American author (28a-b, 37e-38a, 51b, 
etc.). But, as we shall see, for Cooper, the 
main comparison is the one between The 
Theaetetus and The Republic. 
The second and third chapter of the 
book discuss Plato’s arguments against 
Protagoras and Heraclitus in detail. Ac-
cording to Socrates, Protagoras is bound 
to accept that some people’s opinions are 
false, as well as that some people are wis-
er (or, less ignorant) than others, on the 
ground that classes of judgments exist in 
which error is possible (pp. 85-87). Protag-
oras relativistic conception of knowledge 
thus fails. On the other hand, Heraclitus’ 
position is refuted by pointing out that if 
everything is in flux, then the witness him-
self is constantly changing - he is no more 
real than colors and appearances he’s per-
ceiving (pp. 91-92). Plato obviously thought 
that Heraclitean theory of flux is the un-
derlying metaphysical basis for Protago-
rean relativism. Both theories introduce 
the aspect of instability into our notion 
of knowledge. It is also worth noting that 
authors such as Cooper, G. E. L. Owen, 
or H. F. Cherniss, pay much more atten-
tion to Plato’s critique of Heracliteanism 
in The Theaetetus than, for example, W. 
K .C. Guthrie, or A. E. Taylor do. Howev-
er, this is not Cooper’s main concern. The 
main purpose of his argument is to show 
that Plato’s insistence on the stable char-
acter of knowledge and its disassociation 
from perceptual world doesn’t automati-
cally amount to the middle period meta-
physics and the Forms of The Republic. 
We have already seen that the Forms are 
not explicitly brought up as the objects of 
knowledge in The Theaetetus, but schol-
ars such as Cherniss and Cornford, whom 
Cooper critizes in the third chapter of his 
book (p. 7, 121), stick to the claim that Pla-
to’s position in The Theaetetus is nothing 
but a continuation, or addendum to the 
epistemology of The Republic. 
The fourth chapter of Cooper’s analysis 
of The Theaetetus is probably the most sig-
nificant (“The Refutation of the Sense-Per-
ception Theory of Knowledge”, pp. 118–
140), as the reader is acquainted with the 
key premises of his argument against Sho-
rey, Cornford, Cherniss, and other tra-
ditionalist interpreters of Plato’s philos-
ophy. There is no doubt that, for Plato, 
perception cannot be equated with knowl-
edge, “with or without the aid of Heracli-
tean metaphysics” (p. 118). The Theaetetus 
184b-186e ensures us that Plato’s explana-
tion of knowledge rests on certain entities 
which are not objects of immediate per-
ception, but somehow constitute percep-
tion and enable the experience of knowl-
edge. The nature of these non-perceptual 
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entities is questionable for the scholars, 
and the interpretations differ in great ex-
tent. Instead of eidos (usually translated 
as Form), Plato employs the term koina 
in order to denote such entities (185c), and 
koina are “common terms”, such as exis-
tence and non-existence, similarity and 
dissimilarity, sameness and difference, etc. 
This is actually in line with the other late 
dialogues, such as The Sophist, or The Ti-
maeus. In somewhat vague manner, koina 
are associated with ousia, which denotes 
permanent, pure, real existence, and with-
out ousia, knowledge is impossible (152c, 
186c). According to Cooper, traditional, or 
“conservative” Platonic scholars interpret 
these passages in The Theaetetus as consis-
tent with the two-worlds argument found 
in The Republic (the passage 523b-524b is 
emphasized by the author of the book). 
As we know, in The Republic, knowledge 
is restricted to the unchanging world of 
Forms, and there cannot be knowledge 
of perceptual objects, only belief (doxa). 
But if Plato claimed this in such an elab-
orate, extensive manner in The Republic, 
how come Forms do not play any role 
in the explanation of knowledge in The 
Theaetetus? Did he change his mind, or 
did he wanted the Forms to be implicitly 
present in The Theaetetus? The “easier” 
approach to this interpretive problem is 
taken by Shorey and traditional scholars, 
for whom the argument in The Theaetetus 
represents some kind of weaker version of 
the argument in The Republic. On the oth-
er hand, Cooper is right to point out that 
such interpretations are not supported by 
Plato’s writing. Even if koina are Forms, 
nowhere in The Theaetetus is knowledge 
restricted to koina, or intelligible entities 
(p. 121), which means that the dialogue 
is not a mere repetition of the theory of 
knowledge found in The Republic. Coo-
per’s analysis appears to be in line with 
the aforementioned “genetic” school of 
interpretation, as well as, for example, 
S. Rosen’s interpretation of The Sophist 
according to which Plato abandoned the 
concept of Forms in his late dialogues.
The rest of the book examines the last 
two definitions of knowledge proposed 
by Theaetetus: knowledge as true belief 
(187b-201c), and knowledge as true belief 
plus logos (201c-210b). Both are refuted 
by Socrates, and the dialogue reaches no 
definite solution to the problem of knowl-
edge. Nevertheless, the definition of knowl-
edge as true belief plus logos has become 
the cornerstone of traditional epistemol-
ogy, being challenged in the last couple 
of decades only by, for example, contex-
tualist theories. The impact of The The-
aetetus on philosophical epistemology is 
therefore tremendous. In the final chap-
ter, Cooper discusses Plato’s conception 
of logos in The Theaetetus (pp. 234-279), 
which is supposed to be the explanation 
of true belief (alethes doxa) necessary for 
real knowledge. Four “senses” of logos are 
elaborated by Plato, and all four are found 
to be inadequate (some scholars, such as 
Guthrie, perceive three senses of logos, 
see: A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. 5, 
Cambridge Univerity Press, Cambridge, 
1978, pp. 117-120). Cooper considers the 
so-called “dream theory” a separate ver-
sion of the first sense of logos (p. 237, ff.). 
According to this sense, the sufficient con-
ditions for knowledge consist in the expres-
sion of thought in words. The next sense 
is enumeration of all parts, or elements of 
a thing, and the last one, the expression of 
a specific property by which something is 
differentiated from all other things. Being 
that all of these senses of logos are refuted 
by the end of the dialogue, we are back to 
the beginning of our inquiry.
Let us get back to Cooper’s main argu-
ment. How successful is it in disapproving 
Shorey and the traditionalists? There is 
no doubt that The Theaetetus, The Phile-
bus, or The Sophist, propose some kind 
of revision of middle period metaphysics. 
The dualistic position of The Republic, by 
which the world was split into the intelli-
gible and physical realm is now softened 
and possibly abandoned. Plato’s concep-
tion of knowledge does not revolve around 
transcendence anymore, but objectivity (p. 
139). Even The Timaeus strives in this di-
rection. While in The Republic knowledge 
was restricted to intelligible entities, in The 
Theaetetus, or The Philebus (61d-e), Plato 
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explicitly claims that knowledge of senso-
ry, changing objects is possible. But, the 
fact that Plato’s conception of knowledge 
remains grounded in certain intelligible, 
imperceptible principles, no matter if those 
are Forms, or koina, or something third, 
keeps the traditionalists in life. Although 
Cooper rightly claims that we cannot as-
similate metaphysics and epistemology 
of the late period into the two-worlds on-
tology of The Republic, it is also true that 
Plato doesn’t deny this solution explicitly 
by stating that his epistemological consid-
erations in The Theaetetus are entirely sep-
arate from those of The Republic, as well 
as that Forms, from now on, do not play 
any role in the experience of knowledge. 
This topic is an ongoing discussion, and 
therefore, Plato’s Theaetetus by John M. 
Cooper represents a highly valuable con-
tribution to Platonic and ancient philos-
ophy studies.
